We investigate the long-run dynamic interaction between fashion (brand loyalty) and industry structure. We analyze how this interaction affects the importance of fashion in the market for a product in the different stages of its life and characterize conditions under which fashion loses or preserves its relevance over time. The model can explain why some products survive fashion changes. (JEL D21, L0) 
I. INTRODUCTION
Fashion is thought as the tendency of consumers to prefer a variety, design, or brand of a good though it cannot be ranked higher than others in any intrinsically useful dimension. In natural sciences, Darwin's observations suggest that fashion can have dramatic, long-lasting effects. When revisited in the context of the industrial society, these observations inspire two questions: how does fashion influence the evolution of a product and how does this evolution feed back on the role of fashion? Moreover, can the effects of fashion explain why some fashionable varieties survive while others lose popularity when fashion changes? In this article, we take a step toward answering these questions. We examine the dynamic interaction between fashion and industry structure and how this interaction affects the relevance of fashion in the market for a product in the different stages of its life.
In our economy, firms have two observable characteristics: the quality of their production and the prestige of their variety (brand). Both quality and prestige can take a high or a low value. Consistent with Darwin's observations, we assume that agents derive utility from quality but no direct or indirect benefit from prestigious varieties. We interpret fashion as a ''norm'' such that when consumers choose between two varieties with the same quality but different prestige, they opt for the most prestigious one. In other words, in our economy fashion is synonymous of brand loyalty, that is, the systematic tendency of consumers to be loyal to a variety or brand. We analyze how fashion affects firms' decisions in the merger market. By influencing firm mergers, fashion affects the evolution of the industry structure, meant in our context as the distribution of characteristics across firms. In turn, the evolution of the industry structure feeds back on the relevance of fashion. Intuitively, fashion lacks any intrinsic content and is only a norm for choosing among varieties or brands with the same quality. As such, its relevance changes as the set of consumption possibilities evolves with the industry structure.
The way fashion affects firm mergers is the following. A fashionable low-quality firm and an unfashionable high-quality one have the incentive to merge with each other. Intuitively, a low-quality firm benefits from merging with a high-quality firm because it participates to the current profits deriving from high-quality production. In turn, a high-quality unfashionable firm knows that if it faces the competition of a high-quality fashionable firm it will not be chosen by consumers. If this probability is high enough, that is, if the share of high-quality fashionable firms is large enough, this firm will prefer merging and foregoing part of its current profits. By merging with a fashionable firm, in fact, it will potentially gain prestige and will overcome competition. Moreover, whenever such a merger occurs, with some probability the firm generated by the merger inherits both a high (low) prestige and a high (low) quality of production. Therefore, over time the merging process induced by fashion modifies the distribution of attributes (industry structure), which, in turn, feeds back on the relevance of fashion.
We characterize the dynamics of (the relevance of) fashion in two cases. In a first more general case, we allow firms' prestige to decay at an exogenous rate. In this case, the dynamics of fashion is driven jointly by firm mergers and by the decay of prestige. The dynamics turns out to be potentially quite rich: though fashion loses relevance in the long run, for some values of the rate of decay, it can exhibit periods of rising importance followed by periods of declining importance. In a second special case, we shut down the exogenous decay of prestige and focus only on the effects of firm mergers. We find that in this special case one of two scenarios realizes. Under some conditions, fashion leads firms' distribution to a polarized pattern in which firms whose varieties have high (low) prestige have also high (low)-quality production.
1 In this scenario, fashion monotonically loses relevance over time until it has no longer a role when the prestige of a variety becomes perfectly, positively correlated with its quality. This result appears to be quite interesting as the decline of fashion occurs even without allowing for an exogenous decay of prestige. In a second scenario, instead, fashion does not affect the industry structure, that is, the distribution of firms is stationary. In this scenario, fashion preserves its relevance over time.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we examine the related literature. In Section III, we lay out the model. Section IV solves for the equilibrium and presents the main results. Section V analyzes extensions and robustness checks: for example, in this section, we characterize conditions under which fashionable varieties survive fashion changes. In Section VI, we present anecdotal evidence in support of the model and its implications. Section VII concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
This article relates to two strands of literature. First, it relates to the studies on fashion and fashion cycles. Becker (1991) constructs a static model in which fashion is an exogenous consumption externality such that agents derive utility from consuming goods consumed by others. Matsuyama (1992) and Karni and Schmeidler (1990) analyze interactions between classes of consumers (respectively, conformists and nonconformists and lower and upper class) and show that these interactions can generate cyclical variations in the goods demanded. Pesendorfer (1995) constructs a matching model in which hightype agents search for other high types. Fashionable designs are a signal for identifying hightype agents. Pesendorfer (1995) derives a fashion cycle from changes in the production and pricing decision of the producers of fashionable designs and from the consequent change in the number of consumers who buy these designs.
Relative to these studies, we innovate in two dimensions. First, we focus on the interaction between fashion and the supply side of the economy rather than the demand side. Pesendorfer (1995) also focuses on the supply side but analyzes the impact of fashion on firms' production decisions given an exogenous market structure rather than the impact of fashion on the endogenous evolution of the industry structure.
2 Second, these models explain ''fashion cycles,'' that is, how varieties (brands) that are initially prestigious become less fashionable and lose popularity. By contrary, we show that even when the relevance of fashion for a variety decreases, the popularity of the variety could not change or increase over time. This occurs because by influencing the industry structure, fashion affects the intrinsic properties of the variety, such as its quality. Therefore, in the long run, popularity can be a poor indicator of the relevance of fashion. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, relative to this literature, we also put forward a different notion of fashion. In the above studies, a fashionable good carries a direct or indirect advantage to consumers. In our economy, instead, fashion does not have any informational or signaling role for consumers but, 1. In our environment, the market for goods features matching frictions. This implies that consumers have a limited possibility to switch away from low-quality firms and the latter have a positive probability of selling their products.
2. The market for mergers can be compared with the interfirm market for names in Tadelis (1999) . Tadelis (1999) develops a model of adverse selection in which names carry reputation and are traded in all equilibriums. consistent with Darwin's observations, is primitively defined as the loyalty to a brand or variety. Indeed, by interpreting fashion this way, we can abstract from the interaction among consumers on the demand side and focus on the interaction among firms on the supply side.
The second related strand of literature examines the interaction between social norms and economic behavior. The theoretical framework we use is close to that of Mailath and Postlewaite (2005) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) . Under the theoretical point of view, our article focuses on the way social norms affect the correlation between social and productive attributes. For example, we identify conditions under which, in a population of agents with two distinct attributes, a social, unproductive asset and a productive attribute, the social and the productive assets progressively cluster together.
III. MODEL
Consider an infinite horizon, discrete-time economy populated by a unit continuum of firms and a continuum of consumers of measure one half. Firms produce the unique consumption good at no cost.
3 Firms have two attributes, quality of production and prestige. If the good has varieties or designs, the prestige of a firm can refer to the variety or design produced by the firm. Alternatively, the prestige of a firm can refer to its brand. Production can be of high quality (H) or low quality (L). Analogously, firms are divided in two classes of prestige, fashionable (h) and unfashionable (l).
4 Both attributes are exogenously given in Period 0. Moreover, at the beginning of each period a fashionable firm becomes unfashionable (i.e., its prestige decays) with probability 1 À d 2 [0, 1]. Firms maximize their value as given by their stream of profits discounted at the market factor b.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Merger Market).
There is a centralized market where in every period firms can match in pairs and decide whether to merge or not.
The reader should not necessarily interpret mergers in a literal way. In our article, mergers can be interpreted as any form of partnership among firms that influences their characteristics.
The centralized nature of the merger market should be contrasted with the decentralized nature of the goods market (see Assumption 3). Below, we elaborate on this important feature of the model. In order to avoid scale effects, we also assume that when two firms merge, two new firms arise. Without this additional assumption, given our specification of the goods market, a merger would be intrinsically unappealing because the unique firm generated by the merger would meet a number of consumers in the goods market lower than the two original firms.
5
We have to consider two dimensions of a merger. First, we must specify the way firms share value. Second, we must specify the transmission of attributes to the firms generated by the merger. ASSUMPTION 2 (Merging Process). When two firms merge, they equally share value. When the value of an attribute differs between two firms that merge, in the following period a firm generated by the merger has probability one half of having the high (low) value of the attribute. The transmission probability is independent across attributes.
The assumed sharing rule is not crucial for our results. Later in the analysis (Section V), we discuss a way to endogenize this rule as the outcome of a bargaining process and alternative sharing rules that would yield the same qualitative results.
As for the transmission of attributes, Assumption 2 implies, for example, that if a firm with high-quality production merges with a firm with low-quality production, in the following period with probability one half, a firm generated by the merger will have highquality production. 6 The assumption that in 3. We could allow for a positive production cost without any change in the results. Normalizing the production cost to zero simplifies the exposition.
4. When prestige refers to the brand of the firm, we can think that the brand is an idiosyncratic property of firms, that is, each firm carries a brand with high or low prestige. When prestige refers to a variety or design of the good, we can think, for example, that there are two varieties (designs), one with high and one with low prestige. 5. We can think of the two firms generated by a merger as two distinct sites or departments of the same firm. Moreover, if we broadly interpret a merger as any form of partnership, the assumption that two firms arise from a merger becomes very natural.
6. The assumption that these changes occur in the period after the merger captures the idea that they require time. Note that we are working under the assumption that the exogenous decay of prestige occurs after a new firm is generated by a merger. such a merger the high value of an attribute is transmitted with probability one half aims at simplifying the analysis.
The assumption that the transmission probability of an attribute is exogenous deserves justification. In our context, when two firms with different values of an attribute merge, they would always prefer transmitting its high value. However, factors beyond firms' control can constrain their ability to do so. The probability that the high value of an attribute is transmitted can thus be interpreted as an upper bound determined by exogenous factors. We can provide examples of these exogenous factors. Focusing first on quality, we can think that the quality of production stems from the quality of the management or labor force of the firm. When two firms merge, the management of one firm can displace the management of the other and which management prevails can depend on exogenous factors. As for the transmission of prestige, we need to consider the dimension to which prestige refers. For example, if prestige refers to the brand of the firm, we can think that a firm generated by a merger will be fashionable or not according to the exogenous perception of consumers. Again, there is no reason to expect that when merged with an unfashionable one, a fashionable brand preserves or loses its prestige from consumers' point of view.
7 Put differently, in this case randomness in the transmission of prestige would reflect randomness in consumers' perception. Analogously, if prestige is associated with the variety or design of the good, the transmission of the attribute can depend on equally exogenous technological factors. For example, whether from the merger of two firms producing two varieties of the good a producer of one variety or the other arises can depend on which producer has assets that can be more easily deployed in the production of the other variety. Finally, the assumption that the transmission probability is independent across attributes implies that the probability that a firm generated by a merger will have high-quality production is independent of the probability that it will be fashionable. If we allowed the transmission probability to be positively (negatively) correlated across attributes, this would bias our results in favor of (against) finding a positive correlation between prestige and quality in the long run. By assuming independence, we avoid this exogenous bias.
We now describe the rules of exchange between consumers and firms in the goods market. We start with the meeting technology.
ASSUMPTION 3 (Goods Market). The market for the good is decentralized. Each period, a consumer is randomly paired with two firms and chooses from which firm to buy.
The assumption that the merger market is centralized while the goods market operates with frictions can capture the fact that mergers generally occur under the supervision of specialized institutions (e.g., investment banks) while analogous match-making institutions appear to be far less important in the goods market. This assumption is important because it allows us to relate agents' consumption possibilities to the distribution of characteristics across firms (industry structure). Later in the article (Section V), we elaborate on the role of frictions in the goods market and discuss alternative specifications.
To complete the description of exchange in the goods market, we need to specify consumers' preferences and the way consumers and firms decide the terms of trade. In what follows, we consider an economy where prestige matters. ASSUMPTION 4 (Preferences). Unlike quality, prestige does not enter consumers' utility function. If a consumer is paired with two firms with the same quality but different prestige, she will choose to buy from the most prestigious one.
High quality gives a consumer more utility than low quality. Moreover, a consumer derives utility from quality but no direct or indirect benefit from prestigious varieties. Therefore, we interpret the behavior specified in Assumption 4 as deriving from a type of norm in the society. Put differently, in our economy consumers are loyal to fashionable varieties just like Darwin suggested that in a part of Germany, when trading in the cattle market, inhabitants systematically preferred animals with some characteristics even though 7. Choi (1998) develops a model of brand extension. In this model, firms extend well-established brand names to new products in order to signal quality. In Choi's model, there is no room for mergers or other forms of partnerships among firms. Moreover, in Choi's model brand names carry reputation. these characteristics did not carry any extra benefit for them.
We adopt a simplified mechanism to describe how agents decide the terms of trade.
ASSUMPTION 5 (Terms of Trade). In every period, each firm produces one indivisible unit of the good and each consumer receives and can hold one indivisible unit of money.
Assumption 5 implies that the only possible exchange between a consumer and a firm is one unit of money for one unit of good. This allows us to abstract from issues of price competition between the firms and bargaining between consumer and firms over the price of the good. Later in the analysis (Section V), we analyze how our model changes with the introduction of prices. A similar assumption and a similar motivation for its use can be found in the money and search literature(see,e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 or Williamson and Wright 1994) .
The timing of the model is as follows. In every period, firms decide whether to merge or not. After mergers take place, firms enter the goods market where they are paired with consumers who decide from which firms to buy.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM
Consider first consumers' decisions in the goods market. Since high quality yields more utility than low quality, a consumer always chooses a unit of good of high quality, whenever she has the opportunity to do so. From Assumption 4, if a consumer is paired with two firms with the same quality but different prestige, she will choose to buy from the most prestigious one. Finally, if the firms have the same quality and prestige, the consumer will randomize. Consider next firms' decisions in the merger market. Clearly, a fashionable highquality firm has no incentive to merge because it cannot improve its attributes. Moreover, no firm has the incentive to merge with an unfashionable low-quality firm. By contrary, firms with mixed attributes can have the incentive to merge with each other, that is, engage in ''mixed mergers.'' In fact, a low-quality fashionable firm (Lh) benefits from merging with a high-quality unfashionable firm (Hl) because it participates to the current profits deriving from high-quality production. At the same time, a high-quality unfashionable firm knows that if it does not merge with a fashionable firm and gain prestige, in the future it will be chosen by consumers with lower probability (and that this probability is lower, the higher the proportion of high-quality fashionable firms Hh). This happens because prestige affects consumers' choices: whenever in the goods market an unfashionable firm is paired with a fashionable firm with production of the same quality, the consumer chooses the latter.
All in all, the above reasoning implies that we can focus on a merging rule such that Firms with Hh attributes do not merge. Firms with Hl attributes merge with firms with Lh attributes.
Firms with Lh attributes merge with firms with Hl attributes.
Firms with Ll attributes do not merge.
A merging rule is stable when no pair of firms which did not merge can increase their value by merging. We restrict our attention to symmetric allocations. In every period, an allocation is a pair (g, r) where g is the distribution of attributes in the population and r is the merging rule. An equilibrium is then a sequence ðg t ; r t Þ ' t 5 0 such that, in all periods, the distribution of attributes in the population is induced by the merging rule and the merging rule is stable given the distribution of attributes (see Mailath and Postlewaite 2005) .
Before deriving the results, we need to introduce a measure of the relevance of fashion. In our economy, prestige does not bring utility to consumers and is relevant only to the extent that it affects consumers' decisions. In particular, fashion constitutes a selection rule when a consumer faces a choice between two firms with the same quality but different prestige. Therefore, we can measure the relevance of fashion with the probability that a consumer faces such a choice. Formally, letting l Hh t be the measure of firms with Hh attributes in period t (and analogously for l 
In a context with two varieties (designs) of the good, one with high prestige and one with low prestige, we can also define a measure of the popularity of a variety as the number of consumers who demand it. For the h variety, it is easy to see that in period t this equals
A General Case with Decay of Prestige
We first work without imposing restrictions on the rate of decay of prestige 1 À d. In the next section, we consider a special and more tractable case where 1 À d 5 0. We are interested in a scenario where mergers occur for a positive number of periods, thereby affecting the distribution of attributes (industry structure). For what explained above, it is always possible to guarantee that firms have the incentive to engage in mixed mergers by assuming an initial measure of Hh firms not too small. We can prove the following lemma. As long as mergers occur, the distribution of attributes across firms evolves as follows
Proof. In the Appendix.
Using Lemma 1, we can study how the relevance of fashion evolves as long as mixed mergers occur. As anticipated, the relevance of fashion can be measured by the probability that a consumer meets two firms with the same quality but different prestige, that is, l
Consider the second term of the sum, that is, the probability that a consumer meets two firms with low quality and different prestige. Lemma 1 implies that
The derivative of this expression with respect to t is negative if
This condition always holds for t sufficiently large, and when the initial measure of Ll firms is larger than that of Hl firms, it holds for all t. Intuitively, over time both the merging process among firms with mixed attributes and the decay of prestige tend to decrease the measure l Lh of Lh firms and increase the measure l Ll of Ll firms. Next, consider the l Hh t l Hl t term, that is, the probability that a consumer meets two firms with high quality and different prestige. Lemma 1 implies that
In interpreting Equation (6), the reader should keep in mind two elements. On the one hand, the merging process among firms with mixed attributes tends to increase the measure l Hh of Hh firms while the decay of prestige tends to decrease it. On the other hand, the merging process tends to decrease the measure l Hl of Hl firms while the decay of prestige tends to increase it. Therefore, the dynamics of the l Hh t l Hl t term can be quite complex. All in all, the dynamics of (the relevance of) fashion depends on the interaction between the dynamics of l It can be shown that, as long as mergers occur for a sufficiently long time span, the dynamics of fashion is rich. 8 In particular, three cases can be realized according to the rate of decay 1 À d (see Figure 1 for a plot obtained with a numerical example). In a first case, which occurs for a wide range of intermediate values of d, fashion initially increases and then decreases in relevance. Intuitively, initially the outflow of firms from the Hh group due to the decay of prestige exceeds the inflow due to mergers. As a result, the l Ll t terms shrink, reducing the relevance of fashion. In a second (trivial) case (very high values of 1 À d), the exogenous effect of the decay of prestige is overwhelming and the relevance of fashion monotonically declines over time. Finally, there is a third case (1 À d sufficiently low)inwhich the dynamicsof fashion is more complex: fashion initially decreases, then increases, and finally decreases again in relevance. This case is similar to the first case considered above. The only difference is that, since 1 À d is low, the role of the decay of prestige is negligible at the very beginning and starts to kick in only at later stages (which explains why at the beginning fashion declines).
9
So far, we have focused on the dynamics of fashion as long as mergers occur. As discussed previously, in our economy mergers occur when there is a sufficiently large measure of high-quality fashionable firms. In fact, a large measure of Hh firms implies a high probability that an Hl firm will not be chosen by consumers and, hence, a strong incentive to merge and gain prestige. However, in the case with 1 À d . 0 eventually the measure of Hh firms shrinks. This occurs because the number of mixed mergers progressively declines (in fact l Lh declines) implying a progressively smaller inflow of firms into the Hh group, whereas the decay of prestige continues to generate an outflow from this group. When the measure of Hh firms shrinks below a certain threshold, firms stop merging. Therefore, to complete the characterization of the dynamics of fashion, we also need to study how the relevance of fashion evolves after firms stop merging.
LEMMA 2. Consider an initial distribution of attributes such that firms with mixed attributes have the incentive to merge. Let t# denote the period in which firms stop merging. After t#, the distribution of attributes across firms evolves as follows
Clearly, after firms stop merging, the dynamics of fashion is only driven by the decay of prestige and, hence, is not as rich as under mixed mergers. Moreover, this dynamics is somewhat less interesting from the perspective of the article, where we focus on the interaction between firm mergers and fashion. However, it is important to characterize the dynamics of fashion in the long run. 9. In the example, the initial distribution of attributes is l Proof. In the Appendix.
As shown above, because of the interaction between the merging process and the decay of prestige, the relevance of fashion can exhibit different patterns during the transition phase. However, all the patterns lead to a fall in the relevance of fashion in the long run. This is perhaps not entirely surprising in a context with decay of prestige. However, we are going to see that fashion can lose its relevance in the long run even if we shut down the effects of the decay of prestige.
A Special Case without Decay of Prestige
Though insightful, the case with a positive rate of decay of prestige is analytically cumbersome. Thus, henceforth, we turn to a special case where 1 À d 5 0. This allows us to control for the effects of the decay of prestige and focus only on the impact of firm mergers on the dynamics of fashion. Lemma 3 characterizes the equilibrium. 
Moreover, the combination between the rule with mixed merging and the distribution of attributes over time, as given by equation (8), constitutes an equilibrium.
(ii) Under the condition bl Ll t , monotonically declines and converges to zero in the long run (for t / '). Under the equilibrium in (ii), the relevance of fashion remains unaltered over time.
Intuitively, when there is no decay of prestige and mixed merges occur, the distribution of firms progressively converges to an absorbing state with perfect correlation between prestige and quality, that is, where firms are either fashionable high-quality firms or unfashionable low-quality ones (l Hl t 5 l Lh t goes to zero). Therefore, fashion progressively loses relevance as a selection rule until it ceases to have a role in the long run. By contrary, when mixed mergers do not occur, the initial distribution of firms is stationary and fashion preserves its relevance.
In a context with two varieties of the good, one fashionable (h) and one unfashionable (l), it is also easy to verify using Equation (2) that under the equilibrium with mixed mergers the popularity of the h variety grows over time. Intuitively, the merging process supported by fashion allows the fashionable variety to gain quality, and this becomes the driving force behind its popularity in the long run. Summarizing, while the popularity of the variety increases over time, the relevance of fashion for its market decreases. Hence, the model implies that at least from a long-run perspective, popularity can be a poor indicator of the relevance of fashion.
V. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS

Fashion Changes
In the model, we assumed that the classification of varieties (brands) between fashionable and unfashionable does not change over time. We now discuss the effects of fashion changes in a context in which there are two varieties (designs) of the good, one with high prestige and one with low prestige. To analyze this issue, we need first to generalize the transmission mechanism of the attributes. This generalization is also interesting in itself as a check of the robustness of the model. We now assume that there is a probability q . 1/2 such that a firm inherits the high value of an attribute from two merged firms. It turns out that there exists an open region of values of b and q such that, for any nondegenerate initial distribution of firms, merging is part of an equilibrium. In Araujo and Minetti (2006), we analyze this generalized environment formally.
The results that follow are corollaries of those of Section IV. Hence, we only discuss the intuition behind them. 10 We can model fashion changes as exogenous shocks or as the outcome of an endogenous process. We start from considering exogenous shocks. We assume that in each period there is a probability c that the fashionable variety becomes unfashionable and vice versa. This is a onceand-for-all shock, and we assume that its probability c is small enough that, in each period before the shock, mergers are part of an equilibrium.
11 It can be shown that if the shock occurs after a certain period, after the fashion change no merger will occur. In fact, after the fashion change, the Hh firms consist of the Hl firms before the change. If the shock occurs late enough, the distribution of firms will already be sufficiently polarized and the group of Hl firms will be small. Therefore, after the shock, the probability that an Hl firm is paired with an Hh firm in the goods market will be low and there will be no incentive to merge. In such a framework, after the fashion change, the distribution of firms is stationary, and, except for an initial drop at the time of the shock, the popularity of the variety that was initially fashionable remains constant over time. Intuitively, we can say that the variety initially fashionable will have already gained so much quality that after the shock its popularity will be guaranteed by this high quality. Thus, despite its simplicity, this setup allows to explain why fashionable products can survive fashion changes.
We can slightly modify this framework and allow for endogenous fashion changes. It is sometimes argued that whether a variety or design is fashionable or not depends on the number of agents who consume it. Leibenstein (1950) distinguishes between ''bandwagon'' and ''snob'' effect. The first occurs when a consumer demands a good more when others demand it. The snob effect occurs when the demand of a good by others discourages a consumer from demanding it. Assume, for example, that in our economy a snob effect is at work. We relabel the two varieties of the good as a and b, and we redefine the social norm as follows: ''whenever variety a of the good is demanded by less than a measure l a of consumers, with probability c, this variety is the fashionable one. Otherwise b is the fashionable variety.'' Suppose that the initial distribution of firms is such that the popularity of the a variety, as defined in Equation (2), is above l a , that is, a is unfashionable. 12 We already know that the popularity of the unfashionable variety decreases over time because of the merging process. Hence, there will be a period in which this popularity falls below l a and a fashion change occurs with probability c. As in the case of exogenous shocks, if this change occurs late enough, no mixed merger will take place after this endogenous fashion change. Hence, except for an initial drop at the time of the shock, the popularity of the b variety will remain constant over time.
The Role of Prices
In the model, we assumed for simplicity that money and goods are indivisible, thereby eliminating the role of prices. However, this feature is not essential for our results. The only important feature we need to preserve is that firms realize positive profits. In fact, if we allowed firms to engage in price competition, their incentive to merge would disappear because profits would be driven to zero whenever two firms with the same quality compete for a consumer.
We can adopt alternative specifications of the interaction between firms and consumers that preserve the results of the basic model and at the same time allow to investigate the role of relative prices. One such specification, inspired by Allen and Gale (2001) , hinges on the presence of switching costs and lockin effects. Consider the following scenario. The consumption good is still indivisible while 10. More details on the results of Section V are available from the authors.
11. This can be always guaranteed by focusing on the case in which merging is strictly preferred and using a continuity argument. Note that the assumption q . 1/2 is necessary to make the analysis meaningful. It can be shown that, if q 5 1/2, regardless of when the fashion change occurs, firms will have no incentive to merge after it.
12. In the notation of Section III, a corresponds to l and b to h. money is now divisible. A consumer derives utility u H (u L ) from a unit of good of high quality, where 1 . u H . u L .
13 After being randomly paired with two firms in the goods market, a consumer chooses from which firm (if any) to buy the good. Precisely, once the consumer has chosen a firm, she can purchase the good from that firm, switch to the other firm, or not buy the good at all. Moreover, as in Allen and Gale (2001) , the consumer faces a cost c , 1 for switching to the other firm. Finally, a consumer and a firm bargain within the match to determine the allocation of surplus. Using a symmetric Nash bargaining, the price p 1 paid by the consumer if she buys the good from the first firm she chooses solves the following problem
; 0
where u 1 (u 2 ) denotes the utility the consumer derives from the unit of good of the first firm she chooses (respectively, of the other firm). Note that, when bargaining with the firm, the consumer has a strictly positive outside option only if 2c , u 2 , that is, the switching cost is not so high to render the threat of switching not credible. This specification implies, for example, that in the scenario in which the consumer meets a high-quality firm and a low-quality one and 2c , u 2 , the price she pays if she chooses the high-quality firm is
whereas the price she pays if she chooses the low-quality firm is
With this specification, the net surplus the consumer obtains from choosing the highquality firm is thus u H À p HL 5 ðu H =2Þþ ðu L =4Þ À ðc=2Þ, while her net surplus from choosing the low-quality firm is u L À p LH 5 ðu L =2Þ þ ðu H =4Þ À ðc=2Þ. Clearly u H À p HL . u L À p LH , that is, as in the basic framework, the consumer prefers the high-quality firm. Analogous reasonings apply to the other scenarios.
In this modified environment, relative prices matter: when a consumer is paired with two firms of different quality, the price she has to pay for a unit of good of high quality is higher than that she has to pay for a unit of good of low quality. It is easy to see that this modified environment preserves firms' incentive to merge and all the results of the analysis. However, this environment complicates the analysis because it renders the value functions of firms more cumbersome, and this is why we chose to work with indivisible money and goods.
Robustness Issues
Some assumptions of the model deserve further attention. A first assumption worth discussion is the sharing rule when firms merge. This rule can be thought as the reduced form of a bargaining game between the owners of the firms after the merger. Consider the following structure. Each owner carries a specific contribution to the merger. Regardless of any allocation of value agreed before the merger, ex post each owner can threaten to withhold her contribution and induce a renegotiation of the agreement. Thereafter, the two owners bargain over the surplus associated with staying together rather than splitting. If, for example, ex post the owners expect the same value from splitting and they have the same bargaining power, the sharing rule in Assumption 2 will arise endogenously.
14 Therefore, this rule incorporates the idea that firms cannot commit to share profits or operate transfers ex ante. Note that this sharing rule is not crucial for our results. We could assume that the owners can commit so that a merger occurs if and only if the value of the merger exceeds the sum of the values of the two firms in isolation. For example, it can be shown that under this alternative specification, when 1 À d 5 0 mixed merging (nonmerging) would be part of an equilibrium whenever 2ðl A second assumption worth discussion is the existence of frictions in the goods market. These frictionsareimportanttogenerate ameaningful 13. We work under the assumption that a consumer derives linear utility from her money holdings.
14. Rajan (1992) makes an analogous assumption in a different context. Note that there is a whole region of reservation values and bargaining power of the owners such that ex post they equally share the value of the merger. role for prestige. In an economy with centralized trade and without frictions, a consumer could always be in a position to buy a unit of good of high quality. However, some degree of frictions would imply a positive probability that a consumer makes a choice based on prestige and would create incentives for firms with mixed attributes to merge. For tractability, we considered the extreme case in which each consumer faces only two firms at a time. We believe that our results would continue to hold in a context in which the number of firms per meeting is higher than 2, as long as the degree of frictions remains relatively high.
Finally, we restricted our attention to the case in which production can be of high quality or low quality. The main side effect of allowing for more than two levels of quality would be on the relevance of fashion as a selection device. As long as fashion still affects consumers' choices, the results of the article would carry over. For example, if we allowed quality to assume values in a continuum, we would need to modify the meeting technology in the goods market. In particular, in order to guarantee that fashion is still relevant as a selection rule, we would need to assume that each consumer faces a continuum of firms and buys goods from a positive measure of them.
VI. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
In the model, a key factor that generates the interaction between brand loyalty and industry structure is the impact of prestige on firms' merging decisions. We now discuss anecdotal evidence on this role of prestige. We also discuss evidence on the long-run correlation between prestige and quality induced by firm mergers. As stressed throughout the analysis, we interpret a merger both in a literal way and as any form of partnership that affects firms' characteristics in the long run.
The market for glasses provides a first example. In recent years, fashionable brands, such as Prada, Gucci, and Armani, have significantly expanded their presence in the market for eyeglasses and sunglasses. This expansion has mainly occurred through different forms of partnership with established high-quality producers of glasses which, however, lacked comparable visibility. Gucci, Dior, and Pierre Cardin, for example, have reached agreements with the Italian firm Safilo, while Prada and Armani have formed partnerships with Luxottica. In July 2003, the general director of Prada commented on the recent partnership with Luxottica with these insightful words: ''The agreement allows our group to significantly qualify and expand our presence in the market for eye glasses and sunglasses contributing to the success of the agreement with the strength of our brand, our prestige and our design. I am sure that the technological, industrial and distributive strength of Luxottica group will allow us to reach very important quantitative and economic results in a short time.'' The market for legwear and bodywear provides a second example. Similarly to what occurred for eyeglasses, in this market there have recently been several partnerships and joint ventures between famous brands and high-quality producers. In 2004, for example, Armani Group entered a partnership with Wolford for the production of legwear and bodywear. Once again, the comments of the parties involved in the partnership are particularly insightful. Giorgio Armani argued that ''after a careful process of selection, we chose Wolford, a firm leader in the production of legwear for its innovative products, the quality of production and its distribution network,'' while the chairman of Wolford argued that ''we are proud of having been chosen [. . .] which reflects the reputation that Wolford built thanks to its excellent quality. The prestige of Armani brand name will guarantee that our production of legwear will quickly gain an important share in the world market [. . .] .'' The market for furs and luxury clothes provides a third example. In 2005, the Italian stylist Michele Cavalli formed a partnership with Ciwifurs, a producer of furs. Cavalli motivated this partnership with the high-quality production of Ciwifurs, while the management of Ciwifurs stressed the importance of the prestige associated with Cavalli's brand name. Further examples include the 2006 partnership between the Marzotto brand and the firm Guabello for the production of luxury textiles as well as the 2004 agreement between Versace and the Italian group Euroitalia for the production of perfumes. by fashionable brands affects the quality and success of a product in the long run. This example refers to the evolution of the watch industry in the French and Swiss Jura in the last three decades. In the seventies, after decades of leadership in the market for watches, the French and the Swiss industry experienced a dramatic erosion of their market positions. This stemmed from the competition of Asian watchmakers that challenged the strength of Swiss and French watchmakers in the production of mechanical watches by flooding the market with quartz watches. At the end of the seventies, French and Swiss watchmakers significantly lagged behind their Asian competitors in the quartz and microelectronics technology. However, while the Swiss industry underwent a massive restructuring in the eighties and reestablished its leadership in the nineties, the French industry never fully recovered from the crisis. Mailatt et al. (2002) argue that the prestige of brand names represented a key difference between the French and the Swiss industry. Relative to the prestige of Swiss brands and products, ''the majority of French companies delivered their watches under the brand name of a customer, who was either a wholesaler or a foreign importer'' (p. 5). Mailatt et al. (2002, p. 14) maintain that this gap in prestige can partially account for the different success of the two industries in reacting to the crisis. They argue that the prestige of Swiss brands ''enabled Swiss watchmakers in the 1980s to reposition their product around a distinction function which, by giving preference to the emotional aspect of the timepiece over the functional one, required the existence of brand names-something that the french watchmakers no longer had'' (p. 14). In particular, the prestige of the Swiss watchmakers eased mergers, a partnership-based network, and agreements with foreign firms, especially American ones (Mailatt et al. 1995 (Mailatt et al. , 2002 . The merging process culminated in 1984 with the birth of the SMH group (now Swatch) and with the merger and conversion of watchmaking laboratories to form the Swiss Electronics and Microtechnological Centre. In France, instead, the crisis caused the breakup of the watch industry.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have examined the longrun structural effects of fashion. We have proposed a model in which brand loyalty affects the evolution of the industry structure and in turn, by modifying consumption possibilities, the evolution of the industry structure affects the relevance of brand loyalty in the market for a product. We have shown that by analyzing the structural impact on the supply side of the economy, we can explain why fashionable products can survive fashion changes. The model also shows that the structural changes induced by fashion can sustain the popularity of a product while eroding the contribution of fashion to this popularity.
